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COLLYER INSULATED WIRE:
A CASE OF MISPLACED MODESTY
JuLius G. GETMANt
In Collyer Insulated Wire;' the National Labor Relations Board
announced a policy of systematic deferral to arbitration in cases which
could be heard either by the Labor Board or by an arbitrator. Although
the Board retains jurisdiction to vindicate statutory rights ignored or
repudiated by the arbitrator, it will not hold a hearing until the case has
been arbitrated.'
Deferral deprives the complaining party (typically the union) of
advantages which Labor Board adjudication offers. In cases where the
Board accepts jurisdiction, it provides counsel and a hearing officer with-
out cost if its investigation indicates that the charge is meritorious.3 By
contrast, in arbitration these expenses are borne by the parties, and arbi-
trator's and counsel's fees may make regular use of the process prohibi-
tively expensive for small unions. Moreover, small unions or employers
may not have access to competent representatives. 4
The policy of deferral may also deprive the aggrieved party of the
assurance that the tribunal which hears the case will be competent to
address all of its issues and to render a final decision. For example, when
unilateral employer action is being challenged, an arbitrator will typically
be limited to deciding whether the conduct is permitted or prohibited by
the contract. If the conduct is not governed by the contract, the arbitrator
does not have jurisdiction to decide whether the failure to negotiate in
advance of the action violated the duty to bargain under the Fibreboard
'Professor of Law, Indiana University. Professor Getman was a former at-
torney with the National Labor Relations Board and is currently a member of the
National Academy of Arbitrators. Alan Schwartz, Mary Hirschoff and Jerome Mintz
made useful suggestions on earlier drafts. Leland Cross, Esq., a partner of Ice, Miller,
Donadio & Ryan, called several useful cases to my attention.
1. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (Aug. 20, 1971). The case involved
unilateral changes in working conditions which the union and the general counsel con-
cluded violated § 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (5) (1970), under existing Board precedents because the changes were not
first negotiated with the union. For discussion of this doctrine see Schatzld, The
Employer's Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation Sonttiimes, 44 TExAs L. REv. 470
(1966).
2. 192 N.L.R.B. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
3. See National Labor Relations Board, Rules and Regs. and Statements of
Procedure §§ 102.34-36, at 22-23 (Series 8 as amended, 1968), 24 Fed. Reg. 9095
(1959), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 7972 (1963).
4. F. ELxouRi, How ARiITRATiON WORKS 74 (1952). On the matter of costs
see Kilberg & Bloch, Making Realistic the Arbitration Alternative, 50 J. URBAN L.
21,45 (1972).
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doctrine.' Some arbitrators attempt to circumvent the problem by read-
ing the duty to bargain into the contract, perhaps as part of the recogni-
tion clause. However, not only is it difficult to predict whether an arbi-
trator will do so,' but there is also considerable sentiment among arbitra-
tors and the practicing bar that arbitrators should not do so.'
Reliance on arbitration has the additional drawback of increasing the
individual employee's dependence upon the union's support for vindication
of his or her rights. In arbitration the employee is largely at the mercy of
5. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); see Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951). If unilateral action is significant and in violation
of the contract, it violates § 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), because it constitutes a modification of the contract under
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), and the appropriate remedy would be to order the em-
ployer to undo the action. 379 U.S. at 215. If the Board finds that the action is not
prohibited by the contract, it may, nonetheless, violate § 8(a) (5) because undertaken
without prior negotiation. Where the allegation is of a minor infraction of the contract
which would not amount to a modification, then the Board's ability to remedy is limited
to ordering the employer to undo the action until it has been bargained about. In such
cases it might make sense to defer to arbitration.
The situation is somewhat more complicated when a layoff is involved which
might violate § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970) (employer discrimination
to encourage or discourage union membership made an unfair labor practice), on
the grounds that the discharge was for protected concerted activity. In such cases
it is difficult to determine in advance by a blanket rule whether Board or arbitral
jurisdiction would be desirable. If the case really centers around the alleged §
8(a) (3) violation, of course, the Board's jurisdiction would be preferable, partly
because the concept of protected activity is a complicated one, as is the law dealing
with what constitutes a legitimate response. See Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressure by § 7 of the N.L.R.A., 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967). Many arbitrators
are not likely to be familiar with the law in this regard. The § 8(a) (3) allegation
may only be one aspect of the claim that good cause did not exist for a discharge, in
which case the arbitrator would be in a better position to handle the dispute. On the
relation between Board jurisdiction and arbitration in discipline cases see generally
Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BuF. L. REV.
355 (1971) (arguing against automatic deferral) [hereinafter cited as Atleson].
6. A study commissioned by the American Arbitration Association indicated that
338 of 2,300 awards analysed contained issues within the scope of the Board's jurisdic-
tion. In only 54 cases were Board policies in some way acknowledged. See Waks,
Arbitrator, Labor Board, or Both, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec., 1968, at 1, 2.
7. See O'Connel, Should the Scope of Arbitration Be Restructured, in PROCEn-
INGS OF EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 102,
120-28 (D. Jones ed. 1965) (cases cited therein). I have utilized the recognition
clause in this way. See Ralph Rogers & Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 40 (1966). As a regular
part of the Labor Law course at Indiana University, the distinguished labor lawyer
Frederic D. Anderson, past Chairman of the Section of Labor Relations Law of the
ABA, criticizes that part of my decision as a classic illustration of an arbitrator
ignoring the task for which he was hired and claiming for himself a "general license
to do good." The basic issue of the extent to which arbitrators may take their
guidance from the law rather than from the agreement has been the subject of much
diverse discussion at the annual meetings of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
The prevailing view is that it is the arbitrator's duty to enforce the contract, not
the law and that the law only be looked to when the contract is unclear. See Meltzer,
Ruminations about Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE
NLRB AND THE COURT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (D. Jones ed. 1967).
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the union which processes the grievance, chooses the arbitrator and pre-
sents the case. Because of the union's central role, there is a danger that
arbitrators will overlook the rights of employees when they conflict in
some way with the interests of both the employer and the union.8 By
contrast, when a charge is filed which the Board will entertain, the Board
itself controls the investigation and handling of the case thereby pre-
venting the union from defeating the employee's claim. Thus, the doctrine
of automatic deferral to arbitration has serious drawbacks. First, it in-
creases the advantage of wealthy, well-counseled parties. Second, it in-
creases the likelihood that a single case will be bifurcated and tried in
different forums. Finally, the Collyer doctrine makes it less likely that
an individual's claim will be vindicated if the union is either unwilling to
or incapable of pursuing it vigorously.
The question is whether these disadvantages are offset by positive
features of the doctrine. The Labor Board and commentators have sug-
gested a variety of justifications for the policy of deferral. These should
be probed in greater detail.
DEFERRAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Arbitral Erpertise
In the Collyer case the opinion of Chairman Miller and Member
Kennedy stated:
In our view disputes such as these can better be resolved by
arbitrators with special skill and experience in deciding matters
arising under established bargaining relationships than by the
application by this Board of a particular provision of our
statute. The necessity for such special skill and expertise is
apparent ..
The conclusion in Collyer and subsequent cases that arbitrators possess
special abilities is stated without explanation. A close examination, of the
elements of decisionmaking in cases where either the contract or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act"0 might apply offers little reason to suppose
that arbitrators are better qualified than the Board.:"
8. For a good discussion of this point see Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances
Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40, 46-52 (1969). See also
Atleson, supra note 5.
9. 192 N.L.R.B. at -, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1934.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as NLRA].
11. The Collyer doctrine has primarily been applied in two types of cases: (1)
cases in which the employer unilaterally changed working conditions by action which
the union claims violated both the contract and § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)(1970) ; and (2) cases involving discharge or discipline where at least one part of
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(1) Factual Determinations
The cas'es often turn on factual determinations of such items as: past
practice with respect to subcontracting; statements of the parties during or
after negotiation; the actions of discharged employees; and the employer's
motive in discharging employees. The Board's fact-finding processes are
better than those typically available in arbitration. When an unfair labor
practice charge is filed with the Board, a preliminary investigation is con-
ducted by trained government personnel, non-me. itorious claims are dis-
missed and possibilities for settlement are discussed. If the case goes to a
hearing, the issues are usually quite well drawn. The hearing is held be-
fore an administrative law judge where the government, the respondent
and, in many cases, the aggrieved party are represented by attorneys.
The parties know what they wish to bring forth, and the hearing may go
on for several days if the matter is an important one. The hearing officer
has powers of subpoena, 2 and a trained court reporter makes a record of
the hearing so that a complete transcript is available to the examiner
when he makes his decision.'"
In arbitration, on the other hand, the parties are generally not re-
presented by attorneys. The union is usually represented by a business
agent who is apt to be busy with other matters and who often has only a
cursory knowledge of the facts of the case. Companies are often repre-
sented by personnel directors. Thus, each party's case is likely to be
handled by someone who is not skilled in developing facts through ex-
amination and cross-examination of witnesses. Moreover, quite frequently
the issue in dispute has not been isolated, with the result that neither side
is clear about what it wants to prove at the hearing, 4 and it is seldom
the union's contention is that the discharge was in retaliation for protected activity in
violation of § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). In unilateral action cases the
employer typically claims that his action is authorized by the management rights clause
of the contract, by the general concept of reserved rights and by reliance on past
practice of the parties which shows that the contract was negotiated with general
recognition of management's ability to take such action. The union claims that the
contract language prohibits such activity or that the contract does not authorize
management to take action. The union will deny that similar action was taken in
the past without protest. Either side or both will contend that statements made
during negotiations support their interpretation of the language in question. Dis-
charge cases involve the questions of the facts surrounding the discharge and whether
employee conduct constituted good cause for discharge which, in areas of overlap
between the Board and arbitration, will involve whether the activity in question was
protected by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
12. National Labor Relations Board, Rules and Regs. and Statements of Proce-
dure § 102.35(b), at 22 (Series 8 as amended, 1968), 29 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959).
13. Id. § 102.35(i), 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 7972
(1963).
14. Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REV. 733,
734-35 (1957).
COLLYER INSULATED WIRE
possible to extend the hearing beyond a single day in order to ensure that
all the pertinent testimony has been elicited. Often the arbitrator serves
as his own court reporter. While ruling on questions of evidence and at-
tempting to judge the credibility of the witness he must also take notes
on the testimony. This combination of functions makes it more difficult
to observe the witness' demeanor closely. It also means that the record
will be incomplete, omitting some aspects of the testimony and possibly
distorting others."
(2) Impact of Arbitration Decisons on Industrial Relations
In his famous opinion, United States Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,"0 Justice Douglas stated that arbitra-
tors are particularly well-suited to decide the meaning of collective bar-
gaining agreements because of their special knowledge of industrial com-
mon law-the practice of industry and the shop.' He also assumed that
the labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'...
trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment
. . . such factors as the effect on productivity of a particular
result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished."8
Justice Douglas did not discuss the source of the arbitrator's knowledge
of these matters, and the truth of the matter is that even the most ex-
perienced ad hoc arbitrator is no more likely than the Board to be
knowledgeable about these factors in a particular case. As the distin-
guished arbitrator Harold W. Davey has commented:
In most ad hoc situations, the impartial third man arrives
Ideally the movement of the grievance through the successive steps specified
in the agreement is similar . . . to the movement of a law suit. . . . The
issue initially submitted is stripped of irrelevancies and reduced to its barest
essentials. . .. Alas, what an immeasurable distance there is between this
Heaven of theoretical perfection and the Hell of actual practice! . . .
[T~he neat little controversy that he anticipated with its well ordered facts
and carefully delineated boundaries, all too often turns out to be a spraw-
ling, shifting free-for-all, a jumble of conflicting claims, arguments and
objectives.
Id.
15. See generally Davey, Restructuring Grievance Arbitration Procedures: Some
Modest Proposals, 54 IA. L. REv. 560 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Davey] ; Getman,
The Debate Over the Caliber of Arbitrators: Judge Hays and His Critics, 44 IxD.
L.J. 182, 189 (1969).
16. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
17. Id. at 581-82.
18. Id.
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at the scene of the hearing armed with only two salient facts-
the names of the parties and perhaps the knowledge that the
issue concerns discipline, seniority, overtime distribution, or
what have you. In short, the ad hoc arbitrator starts completely
cold at 10 a.m. on the day in question. 9
Experience in arbitrating is not likely to make the arbitrator particularly
well informed about the other intangible factors mentioned by Justice
Douglas, nor does it necessarily make an arbitrator able to understand
the practical consequences of his interpretations.2" The relationship of
an ad hoc arbitrator with the parties terminates after the decision is
issued. Only rarely does an arbitrator learn anything further about a case
after rendering his opinion, and when he does, it is more likely to be the
reaction of the parties than the consequences of the award. Since Justice
Douglas' opinion, there has been considerable comment about the role of
arbitrators. Representatives of the parties have made clear that they do
not expect the arbitrator to take so broad a view of his function and
articles by arbitrators have almost uniformly disclaimed either the ability
to or the desirability of considering the factors referred to by Justice
Douglas.2
(3) Consistency in Contractual Interpretation
The process of applying ambiguous language to specific labor situa-
tions is the regular business of the Board. It may or may not be the
regular business of a particular arbitrator.22 Consequently, there is no
reason to believe that an arbitrator can do this better than the Board.23
19. Davey, supra note 15, at 567.
20. This assumption is very similar to the assumption challenged in Getman &
Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHlI. L. REv. 681 (1972),
that the Board through the process of deciding cases about campaign behavior in
representation elections has acquired some special knowledge of voter behavior.
21. See, e.g., Kagel, Recent Suprente Court Decisions and the Arbitration
Process, in ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (S. Pollard ed. 1961);
Mittenhall, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
in id. at 30; O'Connell, The Labor Arbitrator: Judge or Legislator, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 102(D. Jones ed. 1965). See also Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The
Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 138, 141-45 (1961).
22. In 1970 only 167 of the 1475 arbitrators carried on American Arbitration
Association Panels issued over five awards. The 167 accounted for a substantial number
of awards. See T. McDermott, Survey on Availability and Utilization of Arbitrators
in 1972, undated (unpublished supplement to [1972-731 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEw ARBITRATORS, NATIONAiL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS).
23. The Board has the benefit of a preliminary opinion of the administrative lawjudge and the ability of the members to confer with each other.
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It is desirable that similar contractual provisions be interpreted
similarly because knowledge of how a clause is likely to be interpreted is
helpful in negotiating contracts and facilitating the informed settlement
of disputes. It is easier for the Board to achieve a consistent pattern of
interpretation than it is for individual arbitrators. Abritration involves
literally thousands of co-equal decisionmakers who generally do not have
access to staffs or research assistants and who rarely try to achieve con-
sistency with each other. The final authority of the Board on the other
hand rests with its five members who have the resources available to be
sure that in each case the decisions in similar cases have been considered.2"
(4) Harmony with National Labor Policy and Application of the
Law
It is obviously easier for the Board to interpret contracts in a manner
consistent with national labor relations policy. The Board has greater
familiarity with and access to its own rules than do arbitrators. The
Board is able to determine, for example, whether alleged insubordinate
behavior is protected by § 7 of the NLRA25 and whether a meeting held
prior to a work change constitutes bargaining. The Board is much more
likely to perceive when the contract conflicts with the law, and, as a public
tribunal, it is in a position to affirm the law. In contrast, the position of
arbitrators is more ambiguous. Most arbitrators believe themselves to be
servants of the parties and institutionally incapable of ignoring the con-
tract and following the law.
Thus, the policy of deferral cannot be supported by reference to the
superior expertise of arbitators. If anything, it is the Board which is in
a position to make a more careful and informed decision.
National Policy Favoring Arbitration
The opinion of Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy in Collyer
24. The Board's effort to achieve internal consistency, while desirable, is not
in itself adequate for the needs of the parties because the Board has failed to pay
adequate attention to arbitral decisions. In order to develop a system of contract ad-
judication upon which the parties can rely, the Board should consider not only its
own decisions but the decisions of arbitrators as well, something that the Board has
not done in the past.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 158(a) (3) of this title.
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rested in part on "[t]he policy favoring voluntary settlement of labor
disputes through arbitral processes ... 2 The claim that Collyer
is justified by the national policy favoring arbitration, however, is ques-
tionable on two grounds. First, the national policy favoring arbitration
has been articulated in court opinions dealing with the availability of
arbitration and the enforceability of arbitration awards. The Supreme
Court has considered arbitration as a desirable substitute for industrial
strife and for judicial interpretation of agreements. While its opinions
praise arbitration, the Court has not considered whether arbitration is
preferable to Board adjudication in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, and
the Court .has on occasion been equally complimentary about the Board's
expertise." Furthermore, the most relevant congressional statement of
policy indicates that Board jurisdiction is to continue despite any other
forms of settlement which might be available.28
Second, there is a possibility that the Collyer doctrine will discourage
the use of voluntary arbitration. There has been considerable criticism
of the arbitration process, particularly by unions, in the past few years.
The Collyer doctrine, by increasing the number of arbitrations (and
thereby the cost and the number of issues which arbitrators decide) might
lead unions and small employers to limit the reach of the arbitration clause
or else to find an alternative method of dispute settlement, as some unions
and employers are now doing.
Arbitration is a Better Process for
the Resolution of Contract-Related Claims
Professor Schatzki in an influential article supported the Collyer
doctrine on the grounds that arbitration offers certain advantages as a
system of dispute settlement. He stated:
Generally speaking, arbitration is speedier than the full
26. 192 N.L.R.B. at - , 77 L.R.R.M. at 1935.
27. Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (one of the Court's famous arbitration trilogy of opinions
praising the arbitrator's knowledge of industrial relations) with NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (discussing the Board's special knowledge of
industrial relations and its ability to draw inferences about the effect of employer
speech and action on employees on the basis of that expertise). It is true that in
Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) the Court applied the policy
announced in the trilogy to a representation proceeding but there is no suggestion that
arbitration was to be preferred to Board adjudication.
28. § 10(a) of the NLRA provides:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice. . . . This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: .....
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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Board's processes; furthermore, the parties themselves control
their cases, while before the Board one of the parties loses control
to the General Counsel. The arbitrator, who may be expert in
the industry or in the labor relations of the particular plant, is
almost invariably closer to the context of the dispute than the
Board or the trial examiner. The parties have selected the ar-
bitrator and the arbitration process; this is the manner in which
they indicated, prior to the particular disagreement, they pre-
ferred to resolve their disputes. My own observation tells me
that arbitration is far less formal, less tense, and less exacerbat-
ing to the relationship of the parties, than a Board proceeding.
In contrast, the Board proceeding is often quite bitter, deriving
in part, I suspect, from the increased formality, the intervention
of the General Counsel as a prosecutor, and the formal allegation
by one party that the other is a lawbreaker in a sense more
serious than mere breach of contract (which, after all, is a com-
mon and accepted practice in the business world). In addition,
the arbitrator has access to more flexible remedies: he can "split
the baby." Finally, if the arbitrator makes a bad decision, the
parties can renegotiate immediately, or at their next bargaining
sessions, for a new contract; often, little harm results from the
arbitrator's bad award. I make this last point only to make clear
that the need for Board intervention is not so great, even if the
arbitrator errs. In essence, the whole process is a family
affair. 20
The conclusion that arbitration is speedier is not demonstrated. The
statistics cited by Member Jenkins and accepted by Professor Schatzki
do not compare the speed of Board decision and arbitration when the two
are dealing with similar issues.8" As a result, there are no figures to tell
whether Board cases dealing with unilateral employer action are decided
more quickly than arbitration cases of the same type. Moreover, it would
be surprising if the cases within the area of potential overlap were ran-
domly distributed. It is possible that the cases which went to the Board
were more complicated or important and would be more time consuming
than those which went to arbitration."
29. Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Dispute Under Section 8(a)(5), 50
TEXAs L. REv. 225, 251-52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schatzki].
30. Id. at 251.
31. Although Professor Schatzki points out that the disparity in the figures cited
by Member Jenkins would be greater if one took account of the number of cases in
which the trial examiner's decision was appealed to the Board, the time involved
in arbitration would be greater if one took into account the number of arbitration cases
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Even if arbitration is speedier, this is a consideration which the
party seeking Board relief has rejected in choosing to pursue a Board
remedy. If the aggrieved party (usually a union in these cases) is willing
to forego the advantage of speed in order to obtain the benefits of a Board
decision, why should it not be permitted to do so? Similarly, the argu-
ment that one of the parties loses control to the general counsel of the
Board is not persuasive. It is the party who is seeking Board intervention
which loses control. A union may decide that control over its case is less
important than the economy and professional competence which the Board
offers." Professor Schatzki's observation that "arbitration is far less
formal, less tense, and less exacerbating to the relationship of the
parties" 3 than Board proceedings may be generally true, but that is
only because a large percentage of Board cases arise out of union organiz-
ing campaigns or strikes which are by their very nature highly emotional,
competitive situations, while almost by definition arbitration cases arise
in the context of an established on-going relationship. It is also difficult
to accept the assumption that company officials are so personally offended
by the allegation that they modified a contract improperly under §
8 (d) 3 and therefore violated § 8 (a) (5)33 that future relations between
the parties are imperiled. 6
*Moreover, the claim of more flexible remedies in arbitration pro-
ceedings is not supported by any empirical or theoretical explanation and
is hardly self-evident. The NLRA gives the Board almost total flexibility
in fashioning a remedy." Furthermore, since most cases coming under
the Collyer doctrine involve a dispute about whether company action
violated a contract, there is generally little room for flexibility if the
answer is "yes" and little need for it if the answer is "no." The ability
to renegotiate, as Professor Schatzki notes, applies to Board decisions
as well as to arbitral ones3" although its value is conjectural unless the
decision is one requiring bargaining (which can only be made by the
Board). The winning party will not want to, and cannot be compelled
in which further action was taken by the Board, or cases in which the argument is made
to the Board that the arbitrator's decision should not be referred to. See id. at 251 n.82.
32. See id. at 251.
33. Id. at 252.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (defining the duty to bargain collectively and
providing procedures for contract modification).
35. Id. § 158(a) (5) (employer refusal to bargain collectively made an unfair
labor practice).
36. The observation that the arbitrator "is almost invariably closer to the context
of the dispute than the Board or the trial examiner," Schatzki, supra note 29, at 252,
is either meaningless or a reaffirmation of arbitral expertise discussed above. See
text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
37. See NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
38. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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to, negotiate before the agreement ends. And if the case involves major
changes in plant operations, later negotiations to affect the decision may
not be feasible. If lay-offs are involved, for instance, the affected party
may have a new job by the time negotiations take place. 9
Professor Schatzki also supports the Collyer doctrine by referring
to the voluntary nature of arbitration. He states:
The parties have selected the arbitrator and the arbitration
process. This is the manner in which they have indicated prior
to the particular disagreement they prefer to resolve their dis-
putes."'
He also cites Dean Shulman's oft-quoted statement that the arbitrator
is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior
authorities which the parties are obliged to accept. . . It is
rather part of a system of self-government created by and con-
fined to the parties.41
It is not clear, however, why the voluntary nature of arbitration should
be used as a basis to force a recalcitrant party to arbitrate. Indeed, many
of the benefits of voluntaryism are lost by forcing a party to arbitrate
when it prefers the Board.42  Nor can one infer from the inclusion of a
broad arbitration clause, an intention by either party to remove cases
from the Board's jurisdiction. For the most part, arbitration serves as a
substitute for strikes and unlimited management discretion. The broad
clause is a way of insuring that disputes about what management can
do during the term of the agreement will be decided by a neutral person
but does not indicate which neutral party should decide those cases in
39. Professor Schatzki recognizes this problem and is willing to have the Board
intervene in contract disputes "only when a very substantial impact on employees is
presented." Schatzld, supra note 29, at 261. This pragmatic concession is at variance
with the rest of the article and could, of course, go a long way toward reducing what
I believe to be the unfortunate aspects of Collyer. However, it appears from the
article that Professor Schatzki would very severely limit the cases to be covered
by this exception since he approves the Collyer decision itself and would have preferred
a different result in NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421 (1967), where Board
jurisdiction of a dispute about incentive pay was upheld. I recognize the wisdom of
the Board's deferral to arbitration in cases which would not constitute a modification of
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), and in which the only feasible basis for Board juris-
diction would be unilateral action without prior negotiation under the Fibreboard
doctrine. But this -result can be achieved without the Collyer doctrine by intelligent
application of the principle that only significant unilateral changes are covered by
Fibreboard and by the Board's softening the clear waiver approach to unilateral action
cases.
40. Schatzki, supra note 29, at 253. See also Johannesen & Smith, Collyer: Open
Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. LJ. 723 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Johannesen &
Smith].
41. Schatzki, supra note 29, at 253.
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which Board and arbitrator jurisdiction overlap, particularly since the
interrelation between Board and arbitration jurisdiction has for so long
been so murky.
Consistency, Individual Rights and Saving Board Resources
Professor Zimmer, in his recent article in this Journal," supported
the Collyer doctrine on several grounds.: (1) the system of deferral has
proceeded "consistently and rationally;"" (2) "[t]he system of con-
current jurisdicton did not do a very sensitive job of handling employee
claims against union and management;"45 and (3) "the ever increasing
crunch of expanding case load and limited resources restricts the number
of cases the Board . . . can competently handle," and therefore the
Collyer doctrine represents a more efficient allocation of resources than
did the previous system of dual jurisdiction. 6 Unfortunately, these argu-
ments either do not support the conclusion reached or else they are not
supported in the body of the article.
The contention that the Collyer doctrine has been applied rationally
and consistently is not supported by the text of Professor Zimmer's
article. The article points out that the Board's decisions to defer have,
in fact, been inconsistent in cases involving representation questions"7
and that the Board has used two different basic rationales to support the
doctrine of deferral,48 one in Collyer and another in National Radio Co."9
The claim to consistency is also belied by the multiplication of subdoc-
trines described in the article.
Although it may be true that the system of concurrent jurisdiction
did not do a sensitive job of handling employee claims against union and
management, greater reliance on arbitration is likely to exacerbate rather
than improve the situation. Because the process is controlled by the parties
and since the arbitrator is chosen by the parties, there is a danger that
42. This is not to say that a recalcitrant party should never be forced to arbitrate
on the basis of its earlier promise. Such compulsion may be necessary to make the
original promise meaningful. However, in such circumstances it is misleading to
describe the process as a voluntary one and the benefits which Dean Shulman associated
with the voluntary nature of arbitration are lost, as he himself recognized. Indeed,
Shulman said: "When the autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties
better be left to the usual methods for adjustment of labor disputes rather than to
court actions . . . . I suggest that the law stay out." Shulman, Reason, Contract,
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAgv. L. Rxv. 999, 1024 (1955).
43. Zimmer, Wired for Collyer: Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Juris-
diction, 48 IND. L.J. 141 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Zimmer].
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Johannesen & Smith, supra note 40.
47. Zimmer, supra note 43, at 183-84.
48. Id. at 176-77.
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arbitrators will overlook the rights of employees when they conflict with
the interests of both the employer and the union."
Professor Zimmer argues that individual rights are protected by the
doctrine that the Board will not defer to arbitration where the position
of the union and the individual employee's are not in substantial har-
mony." However, this argument is somewhat confusing because the
Collyer doctrine even as modified by the substantial harmony rule can-
not result in a net improvement over the previous system of dual juris-
diction which Professor Zimmer criticized. The threat to individual rights
occurs when the union and the employer make common cause against the
employee or when the union through lack of concern or ability fails to
adequately pursue the claims of employees. The possibility that individual
rights will be denied through breach of the duty of fair representation
by unions is greater in arbitration than before the Board. In arbitration,
as mentioned above, the employee is largely at the mercy of the union
which processes the grievance, chooses the arbitrator and presents the
case. By contrast, when a charge is filed which the Board will entertain,
the Board itself controls the investigation and handling of the case and
the union is not in a position to defeat the employee's claim. The sub-
stantial harmony rule is a way of ameliorating the more obvious cases in
which the interests of the union and the employee differ by transferring
such cases to the Board. Implicit in Professor Zimmer's praise for the
doctrine is recognition of the fact that the greater the willingness of the
Board to proceed on the basis of individual complaints the greater the
likelihood that individual rights will be protected..
Despite the substantial harmony doctrine, individual employees are
now required, because of Collyer, to place greater reliance on a system of
adjudication controlled by the union. The substantial harmony doctrine
is applied only where the conflict is apparent from the investigation of the
case, either in the union's refusal to process or in opposing a grievance.
It is unlikely to be applied where the union goes through the formal
steps of representation but does not in fact support the grievance.2
The argument that deferral helps to preserve the scarce resources of
the Board is intitially appealing. However, it is not at all clear that the
49. 198 N.LR.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (July 31, 1972).
50. See note 8 supra.
51. "The most encouraging part has been the sensitivity of the Board to the
protection of statutory claims of employees in adopting its substantial harmony rule
."' Zimmer, supra note 43, at 196.
52. The difficulties involved in determining the adequacy of representation are
discussed in Atleson, supra note 5, at 368-79. See also Gould, Judicial Review of
Employment Discrimination Arbitrations, in LABOR ARBrrRATioN AT THE QUARTER-
CENTURY MARK: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETNG, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 114-49 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1972).
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Collyer doctrine will have the desired effect. It is possible that many
cases in which the Board refuses to exercise jurisdiction will return to
the Board on the grounds that the arbitrator's award was inconsistent
with the national policy or else that the arbitrator did not consider a claim
arising under the NLRA. The complicated nature of many of the
Board's rules and the fact that most arbitrators are not experts in their
application means that the question of consistency with Board rules will
continue to be a troublesome one and that many of the claims of incon-
sistency will be upheld. Similarly, since many arbitrators do not regard
it as proper to hear claims arising under the NLRA, it may be difficult to
tell from the award itself whether statutory rights were in fact considered.
As was inevitable, the Collyer doctrine has led to the development
of subordinate rules to determine when the Board will defer in cases in-
volving different types of questions under the NLRA. For example, there
seems to be some confusion about when the Board will defer in cases
which involve representation issues.5" In these cases, the determination
of whether the union's and the employee's interests are in substantial
harmony creates the need for a special investigation which would be
unnecessary if the Board simply asserted jurisdiction. Neither the boun-
daries of the substantial harmony rule nor its relation to the duty to fair
representation have been worked out.54 Moreover, the substantial har-
mony test may lead to manipulation by unions in an effort to achieve
Board adjudication by refusing to process grievances.
In addition, as Professor Zimmer points out, under the Collyer doc-
trine as currently interpreted, the Board does investigate the charge to
determine the possibility of jurisdiction before deferral. In sum, the
decision to defer may be preceded and followed by a complicated inquiry
by the Board about what happened or whether to take jurisdiction. With
these considerations in mind, it is not at all clear how significant a portion
of the Board's case load will be affected by the doctrine.
Indeed, the Board's resources may ultimately be further burdened
by untangling the inconsistencies between the Callyer doctrine and an-
other of the Board's policies. Under current Board law, unilateral
action by an employer violates § 8(a) (5)56 even where the collective
53. Zimmer, supra note 43, at 182-85.
54. "The most significant question is what scope will be given the 'substantial
harmony of interest' rule." Zimmer, supra note 43, at 190. Professor Atleson has
pointed out that "deference policy requires an investigation into matters not strictly
relevant to the merit of an unfair labor practice charge." Atleson, .mpra note 5, at
361.
55. Zimmer, supra note 43, at 195; see NLRB General Counsels' Re'ised Guide-
lines for Use of Board Regional Offices in Cases Involving Deferral to Arbitration,
83 L.R.R.M. 42, 55-56 (1973).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
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bargaining agreement contains a so-called "zipper" clause stating that
the parties waive the duty to bargain during the term of the agreement.
Unilateral action is only permitted when the agreement expressly so states.
This is the so-called "clear waiver rule."' 7  It serves to increase the
Board's workload by increasing the number of possible unfair labor prac-
tices which an employer may commit during the course of an agreement
and to reduce legitimately bargained for management discretion.
It has been pointed out that the Collyer doctrine and the clear waiver
rule are basically inconsistent in terms of the weight that is given to the
competing considerations of volunteerism and effectuation of statutory
rights. 8 The clear waiver rule assumes that employees do not mean to
waive statutory rights even when they use language which on its face
would suggest that they do, while the Collyer doctrine finds an implied
waiver of these rights in the establishment of an alternative system of
dispute resolution without any reference to Board jurisdiction. It is
doubtful that the Collyer doctrine will, as has been claimed for it, signifi-
cantly improve the problems caused by the Board's rigid application of
the clear waiver rule. Arbitrators do not have a clear waiver rule. Where
a contract contains both a zipper clause and a broad management rights
clause, an arbitrator is likely to hold that management had the right to
take the disputed unilateral action. The issue will then be raised whether
the Board will accept an arbitrator's determination that an employer was
authorized to take certain action in a case in which the Board were it
to have ruled in the first instance, would have found a violation because
there was not a clear or unmistakable waiver of the duty to bargain. If
the Board does not accept arbitral decisions in conflict with its clear waiver
doctrine, it is possible that a significant number of the cases will ulti-
mately return to the Board to be tried de novo. 5 In any case the inherent
contradictions between the Collyer doctrine and the clear waiver rule are
likely to provide another complication in an area already overloaded with
technical rules. It would be easier for the Board simply to abandon its
clear waiver rule.
57. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1585 (1965); Tide Water
Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1946).
58. See Leznick, Arbitration as a Limit on the Discretion of Management, Union
and the NLRB, in PRocEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CoN-
FERENcE oN LABOR 7, 24 (T. Christensen ed. 1966) ; Schatzkd, supra note 29, at 256-57.
59. Thus, if an arbitrator were to rule that a contract authorizes the
employer to abolish the Christmas bonus, the only way the Board could
enforce its "clear waiver" rule would be to overrule the prior determination
and hold that the contract does not permit the employer's action.
Schatzki, supra note 29, at 255.
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NATIONAL RADIO Co.: A CASE STUDY
Many of the defects inherent in the Collyer doctrine are illustrated
by the Board and arbitral decisions in the various National Radio cases.6"
In its first decision in this matter the Board refused to hear a complaint
that a company had violated § 8(a) (5) by unilaterally imposing a rule
requiring that union representatives record and report their movements
in the plant while processing grievances on compensated time and §
8(a) (3) by discharging a union representative for violating the rule."
The Board in a long opinion announced the applicability of the Collyer
doctrine to § 8(a) (3) cases.2 It assumed that the arbitrator would
resolve both the § 8(a) (3) and § 8(a) (5) questions in a matter not
" 'repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act'."83 Thereafter, an
opinion was issued by arbitrator Archibald Cox which found that the
discharge was not motivated by union animus and was legal.8 He found
that even if the reporting clause was in violation of the contract, the dis-
charged employee should have filed a grievance and not simply dis-
obeyed. 5 Professor Cox did not deal with the claim that the reporting
clause was a violation of § 8(a) (5) because that was unilaterally estab-
lished. However, he stated: "I should be surprised if this were even
technically the law. Certainly, it is not important to any basic policy of
the Act.""8 Thereafter, the grievant sought further consideration from
the Board. In another long opinion and over a strong dissent, the
Board refused. The Board rejected the claim that the arbitration award
was repugnant to the Act because the arbitrator did not consider the §
8(a) (5) allegation:
Moreover, as the arbitrator noted, the Charging Party initially
did not ask him to resolve the issue of the propriety of the
manner in which the rule had been promulgated in the arbitra-
tion and subsequently did not avail itself of the unopposed op-
ortunity to expand the scope of the arbitration procedure to in-
clude that issue. Finally, at no time prior to the issuance of
the award did the Board receive a timely motion from the Charg-
ing Party that any issue as to the propriety of the rule or the
60. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 84 L.R.R.M. 1105 (Sept. 11, 1973), denying motion
for further consideration of 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (July 31, 1972);
National Radio Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 78 (1973) (Cox, Arbitrator).
61. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (July 31,
1972).
62. Id. at -, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1718.
63. Id. at-, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
64. 60 Lab. Arb. at 84.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id. at 82.
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nature of its promulgation had not been resolved by amicable
settlement in the grievance procedure or had not been submitted
to arbitration."7
Dissenting members Fanning and Jenkins asserted that the arbitrator
was mistaken as to the law with respect to bargaining and accordingly,
they concluded that the Board should not accept the award:
In this he seems quite plainly to be in error. Employers may
not act unilaterally on mandatory subjects of bargaining unless
the employees' collective-bargaining representative has clearly
and unmistakably waived its right to be consulted. See
N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corporation, 385 U.S. 421, 64
LRRM 2065; N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 50 LRRM
2177; N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S.
217, 24 LRRM 2088. We do not say that the arbitrator failed
to discharge his arbitration functions. Those functions are more
limited, however, than those of the Board with respect to unfair
labor practice issues generally and with respect to the issues
involved in this case. The Board cannot properly refuse to apply
the law as set forth in the statute as interpreted in these
Supreme Court decisions. 8
Several aspects of the National Radio decision are worth noting.
First, far from lightening the Board's caseload, the effect of applying the
Collyer doctrine was to require two elaborate Board opinions discussing
the relationship between Board adjudication and arbitration. Each con-
tained a long dissenting opinion, and in neither was the merits of the
grievant's statutory claim decided.
Second, in the arbitration proceeding69 the union did not effectively
raise the statutory issue arising from the management's unilateral in-
stitution of the reporting rule. As a result, the arbitrator limited himself
to a cursory analysis of this point which quite possibly misstated the law
as to § 8(a) (5),7 and he did not consider the relationship between a pos-
sible § 8(a) (5) violation and the discharge. The fact that an arbitrator of
the stature and learning of Professor Cox was unable to deal effectively
with statutory issues surely demonstrates how poor a forum arbitration
is for the vindication of statutory rights.
Third, after remitting the union to its contractual remedy with the
67. 205 N.L.R.B. at -, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1106.
68. Id. at -, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1108.
69. National Radio Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 78 (1973).
70. See text accompanying note 68 mcpra.
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assurance that the Board would retain jurisdiction to make certain that
statutory rights were protected, the Board majority concluded that the
arbitrator's decision was not " 'repugnant to the policies and purposes of
the Act' ""' without even considering the correctness of the arbitrator's
interpretation of § 8(a) (5) or of the relationship between § 8(a) (5)
and § 8(a) (3) in this context. Thus, the grievant was deprived of a
hearing on the merits of his statutory claim because of the inability of
the union to press it, a function which the union had sought to disclaim
and which the Board required it to assume by its original decision deferr-
ing the proceeding to arbitration.
It is not difficult to understand the Board's reluctance to overturn
an already issued award. In addition to the normal reluctance of one
decision maker to reject the decision of another, the Board is undoubtedly
concerned not to encourage parties to submit arbitration awards for re-
consideration. Moreover, the Board's initial decision to defer is an ex-
pression of confidence in the ability of the arbitral process to deal with
statutory issues. To reject the award thereafter would be an admission
that the confidence was misplaced. Nevertheless, the abdication of the
Board's own function, implicit in the acceptance of the award on these
terms, seems unfair both to the union and to the grievant and poses a
danger to the effectuation of statutory rights. The dissenting opinions
indicate that these points are recognized by a least two Board members.
It would therefore be surprising if the Board routinely followed this pre-
cedent. Future efforts to obtain reconsideration of decisions by less
prominent arbitrators may be better received. Thus, applicaion of the
Collyer doctrine will present the Board with the unpleasant alternatives
of either ignoring statutory rights or of encouraging parties to resubmit
arbitration awards to the Board.
CONCLUSION
The Collyer doctrine denies employees claiming a violation of statu-
tory rights access to the forum specifically created to effectuate those
rights. They are remitted instead to arbitration which is costlier and
which in some cases will not be able to deal with all of the issues raised.
Moreover, the benefits claimed for the Collyer doctrine are highly
questionable. Arbitration has many defects and these are likely to be
exacerbated in cases in which claims under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act are raised. Nor is it at all clear that the doctrine will simplify
dispute resolution and help to preserve the resources of the Board. In
many cases it might have just the opposite effect. Accordingly, it would
71. 198 N.L.R.B. at - , 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
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be much more sensible for the Board Regional offices to determine in
specific cases whether a party claiming violations of the NLRA should
be restricted to his contractual remedy. Such a decision should not be
made lightly but only when it appears that the arbitrator is more likely
than the Board to be able to resolve the entire dispute.
